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Between the Species
Negotiating the Anthropological Limit:
Derrida, Stiegler,
and
the Question of the “Animal”
ABSTRACT
Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical
and religious turns in the thinking of Jacques Derrida, few have noticed that his late writings were marked by what we could tentatively
call a “zoological turn.” This is surprising given that in The Animal
That Therefore I Am Derrida clearly stated that the question as to what
distinguishes the human from the animal has for him always been the
most important question of philosophy. This essay will attempt to offer a preliminary exploration of this still largely uncharted aspect of
Derrida’s thought. Starting from a brief overview of Derrida’s most
important writings on the question of the animal, it will be argued
that his decision to write an entire book on this issue was largely motivated by his eagerness to settle a discussion with one of his pupils,
the French theorist of technology Bernard Stiegler.
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In a collection of lectures published as The Animal That
Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida elaborates a critique of “the
gesture [that] seems to constitute philosophy as such” (2008,
40), namely the positing of a single and indivisible dividing
line separating the animal from the human. For Derrida, the
question of the animal is, therefore, not one more pressing
question among many others, but probably “the most important
and decisive question” (2008, 34), a question which he says to
“have addressed a thousand times, either directly or obliquely,
by means of readings of all the philosophers I have taken an
interest in” (2008, 34). Hence, what for Derrida secretly unites
Descartes, Kant, Levinas, Lacan and Heidegger is that these
thinkers simply oppose the Animal to the Human by denying
all animals certain qualities that are supposedly only proper to
man (2008). To counter this tradition, Derrida will, however,
not give back to the animal what man has always deprived it
of―a gesture that risks introducing biological continuism and
all the dangerous implications thereof―but argue that all living
beings, including the human, suffer a radical powerlessness.
Although the publication of The Animal That Therefore I
Am aroused an increasing interest in what could tentatively be
called Derrida’s “zoological turn,” few have noticed that he
did not write this work to open a new area of research, but
rather aimed to elucidate an approach to this issue that he had
already been defending at least since the early nineties. Starting from a brief overview of Derrida’s most important writings
on the question of the animal, I will show that his critique of
the anthropocentric bias in Western thought in this book does
no longer simply concern the view that man is superior to the
animal by having some transcendental quality, but, on the contrary, by having no qualities whatsoever. The reason for this
change of discourse is that Derrida wanted to demarcate his
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own approach more clearly from that of a former pupil of his.
Indeed, Derrida’s main argument in The Animal That Therefore
I Am that the Western philosophical tradition considers man’s
superiority over the animal to be the result of an “originary
fault,” as well as the fact that he sees the basic structure of this
argument most overtly formulated in the Greek myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, are clearly references to the work of
Bernard Stiegler who made precisely of Epimetheus’s fault the
emblem of his multiple-volume work Technics and Time. To
conclude, I will suggest that Stiegler’s project to think anthropogenesis as mutually constitutive with technogenesis should
itself be understood as an attempt to correct what he thought to
be Derrida’s insufficient elaboration of the question regarding
the singularity of the human animal.
Derrida’s statement about the central importance of the
question of the animal in his work arrives rather unexpectedly.
Indeed, at first sight this claim seems to be in flagrant contradiction with the simple fact that Derrida apparently has not addressed this question as a specific subject of inquiry prior to
the publication of The Animal That Therefore I Am. To be sure,
there has never been a lack of animal figures in Derrida’s texts,
but the strategic functions these animal figures fulfill are usually highly context-dependent and text-specific and certainly
do not set the stage for a more profound investigation of the
larger stakes of this issue. And yet, there nevertheless seems
to be every reason to take this claim seriously. As if he wants
to convince his readers that he is not merely using a hyperbole
when making this claim, Derrida bluntly declares in this text
that “logocentrism is first of all a thesis concerning the animal”
(2008, 27). Derrida’s versatility as a thinker renders it wellnigh impossible to detect an overarching theme in his writings.
But it would certainly not be inaccurate to state that his critique
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of logocentrism―Western philosophy’s assumption that there
is a foundational principle of being and that this principle can
be grasped through reason and discourse―motivates nearly all
of his readings of texts of the Western philosophical tradition.
Looking back at his early writings such as Of Grammatology
(1974) and Writing and Difference (1978) from this perspective, one could indeed argue that the “quasi-transcendental”
concepts he elaborated in these works, such as the trace, the
grammē and arche-writing, can also be read as potentially holding a strong critique of the rigid human/animal distinction bequeathed by the tradition. But even if we grant him the benefit
of the doubt and assume that he did not merely retrospectively
project a more recent sensitivity onto his early work, this issue was surely not at the centre of Derrida’s attention at that
time. It was therefore generally assumed, and even more so following the so-called ethical turn of deconstruction marked by
the growing influence of the work Levinas on Derrida, that his
critique of logocentrism was mainly intended to call attention
to the many forms of human alterity that come to disturb the
self-certain subject. However, if we follow Derrida’s lead we
should try to understand that this critique was above all meant
to be a critique of the age-old presupposition that the “animal
other” is deprived of logos.
One of the first times Derrida explicitly addressed this issue
was in an interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco. Here Derrida
argues that the relations between humans and animals must
change drastically and adds that this is not merely an “ontological necessity,” but also, and especially today, an “ethical duty”
(2004, 64). In contrast to his brief and rather purely theoretical
reflections on this issue in earlier texts, on this occasion and in
The Animal That Therefore I Am he even goes as far as stating
that “a war has been declared on so many animals” (2004, 67)
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and that the violence inflicted upon them could even be compared “to the worst cases of genocide” (2008, 26). Many consider this comparison between the slaughtering of animals and
the systematic liquidation of human beings totally unacceptable
because it illegitimately equates the worst cases of human suffering and the treatment of animals in big industry. We would,
however, completely misunderstand Derrida’s intention if we
take it to mean that he is blind to the fundamental differences
between these two kinds of suffering, or even worse, that he
abuses the suffering of those who were murdered in genocides
to call attention to the suffering of animals. His point is not that
we put too much weight on human suffering in comparison to
animal suffering, but that we do not pay enough attention to
the singularity of animal suffering. As Matthew Callarco has
argued,
The very difficult task for thought here is to bear the
burden of thinking through both kinds of suffering in
their respective singularity and to notice relevant similarities and parallel logics at work where they exist. To
do so requires abandoning… the hierarchical humanist
metaphysics that we have inherited from the ontotheological tradition (2008, 112).
The common opinion that human life is intrinsically more valuable than animal life is deeply embedded in Western tradition
and culture and it will therefore take more than rational argumentation and political commitment to bring about a radical
reorientation of our value system. So although Derrida declares
to have much sympathy for initiatives such as those of the animal rights movement (2004, 74), he is far from convinced that
the violence against animals could be stopped or lessened by
simply granting them legally sanctioned rights. For not only is
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it exactly the Cartesian model of subjectivity upon which the
modern concept of rights is founded that he considers to be
responsible for justifying anthropocentric violence in the first
place, but he also clearly states that he has “never believed in
some homogenous continuity between what calls itself man
and what he calls the animal” (2008, 30). This latter statement
is clearly directed at animal rights theorists such as Peter Singer
who argue that one should grant “human” rights to those animals that are endowed with sufficiently developed cognitive
capacities. Since Derrida takes this to imply that certain species
of animals are to be considered superior to, for example, mentally-ill persons, he calls such strategies that deny any qualitative difference between humans and animals nothing less than
“ridiculous and heinous” (2004, 67).
It should be clear, then, that Derrida takes issue with both
dominant positions in the discussion of the human/animal relation. It is no surprise though that the largest part of his writings on this problem deal with the anthropocentric bias of the
continental philosophical tradition. His main critique of this
tradition is that it has always given man a privileged position
among the living creatures by endowing him with qualities, essences or “propers” such as language, consciousness, reason
or moral awareness, which animals apparently do not possess.
At the same time, however, he seems to be equally critical of
those who strive to undo the metaphysical separation of man
and animal by giving back to the animal the qualities that man
has always deprived it of. According to Derrida, such a view
does not take sufficiently into account the singularity of all living beings. In other words, Derrida aims to undo the radical human/animal binary, but at the same time he also wants to avoid
putting man on the same ontological level as the animal. The
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question is, of course, whether it is actually possible to steer
clear from both of these positions.
It seems as if the full import of this problem only started
to dawn on him in the wake of his critical confrontation with
Heidegger’s thought. It is well-known that Heidegger was an
ardent critic of the many forms of “ontotheological humanism”
that populate the philosophical universe and it would therefore
have seemed reasonable for Derrida to assume that Heidegger’s
writings contain a thinking that does not take for granted the
radical human/animal divide. It is probably with this expectation in mind that in Of Spirit (1989) Derrida ventured a critical
reading of Heidegger’s only text that explicitly broaches the
problem of the being of the animal, namely The Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics (1995). The guiding threat of Heidegger’s argument in this lecture course is constituted by three
theses: the stone is wordless, the animal is poor in world and
man is world-forming. Derrida calls particular attention to the
obscurity of the second thesis: what does being poor in world
mean? Heidegger is quick to argue that this thesis certainly
does not imply that there is a difference in degree between the
human and the animal in the sense that the animal has only
limited access to the entities in the world to which the human
would have full access. Given that Heidegger clearly states that
“every animal and every species of animal as such is just as
perfect and complete as any other” (Heidegger 1995, 194), it is
certainly not the case that these characterizations should be taken as an evaluative ranking of some sort. Yet, the animal must
certainly have some access to the world, otherwise it could not
be distinguished from the stone of which he said that it has no
access to the world at all. The animal, Heidegger will conclude,
has access to entities, but it does not have access to entities as
such. Derrida comments as follows:
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This analysis, certainly, has the interest of breaking
with difference of degree. It respects a difference of
structure while avoiding anthropocentrism. But it remains bound to reintroduce the measure of man by the
very route it claimed to be withdrawing that measure—
this meaning of lack and privation (1989, 49).
A lizard lying on a rock, to use one of Heidegger’s examples,
certainly relates to that rock in some way, but it certainly does
not relate to the rock as such. The animal, Heidegger argues,
is completely captivated (benommen) or absorbed by the entities that constitute its environment and therefore cannot have a
free relationship to them. It always has a relation of utility with
the entities it encounters and therefore cannot let the rock be
what it is. Since the animal is captivated by its environment,
the possibility to apprehend something as something is structurally withheld from the animal (Heidegger 1995, 247). This
phenomenological possibility to reveal an entity in its being is
reserved for Dasein only. Derrida concludes:
I do not mean to criticize this humanist teleology. It
is no doubt more urgent to recall that, in spite of all
the denegations or all the avoidances one would wish,
it has remained up till now… the price to be paid in
the ethico-political denunciation of biologism, racism,
naturalism, etc. (1989, 56).
The question is then whether Derrida himself found a way to
avoid the twin pitfalls of metaphysical humanism and biological reductionism. At the time Derrida wrote Of Spirit he
still seemed to be very skeptical about the prospects to actually achieve this goal. Heidegger’s case is exemplary in this
respect. Although he consistently rejected both the reduction of
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Dasein to a biological entity and the metaphysical determination of man as a rational animal, Derrida points out that in his
notorious rectoral speech, “The Self-Assertion of the German
University” (1993), Heidegger capitalizes on both evils at the
same time by spiritualizing the forces of “earth-and-blood.” He
consequently ends up combining “the sanctioning of nazism
and the gesture that is still metaphysical” (Derrida 1989, 40).
Having become aware that it is simply impossible to twist oneself completely free from both humanism and biologism, the
question for Derrida then becomes that of knowing which is
the least grave form of complicity with these two “evils.” In Of
Spirit he does not yet elaborate such a negotiation with the anthropological limit, but he does give an indication of how one
would probably have to proceed:
[C]an one not say just as legitimately that the havinga-world also has for man the signification of some unheimliche privation of world, and that these two values
are not opposed (1989, 50)?
This is indeed the strategy that Derrida will follow in Aporias
(1993). In the second essay of this short book, “Awaiting (at)
the Arrival,” Derrida reminds us that Heidegger opened his Being and Time by arguing that Dasein is the only entity in the
world that has the ability to question its own being and that an
analysis of its existentials provides a privileged starting point to
reopen the question of being as such. In the second part of his
magnum opus, Heidegger shows that Dasein’s exceptionality
resides in the fact that it is the only entity that has an experience of death. Only human Dasein can die, animals simply perish. Death, in other words, is Dasein’s most proper possibility.
But, Derrida objects, is death not exactly an experience that
will never present itself to Dasein and thus actually its most im-
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proper possibility? No one will be able to experience his own
death, no one will be able to “live” this experience. From this
perspective, the relationship between Dasein and the animal
suddenly appears in a very different light:
But if the impossibility of the “as such” is indeed the
impossibility of the “as such,” it is also what cannot
appear as such. Indeed, this relation to the disappearing
as such of the “as such”—the “as such” that Heidegger
makes the distinctive mark and the specific ability of
Dasein—is also the characteristic common both to the
inauthentic and to the authentic forms of the existence
of Dasein, common to all experiences of death and
also, outside of Dasein, common to all living beings in
general (Derrida 1993, 75).
Heidegger’s metaphysical humanism is here defeated on its
own terrain. To be sure, not by granting animals access to death
“as such,” but, on the contrary, by showing that Dasein does
not have that access either.
Human finitude, Derrida recapitulates in The Animal That
Therefore I Am, does not reside in man’s ability to run ahead
towards death, but in the fact that man is not able to experience death as such, in a lack of power, in a not-having of the
“as such.” This brings the human in close proximity to the animal. The most important question, Derrida argues, is therefore
not whether animals do or do not have access to logos, speech,
spirit, tekhnē, death, and the like, but to know whether animals
can suffer. Being able to suffer is precisely this possibility without power, this radical finitude that man shares with the animal.
At the time of the writing of The Animal That Therefore I
Am, however, Derrida seems to have become aware of the fact
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that this line of thinking could also clear the way for a more
subtle version of anthropocentric thought. This strand of anthropocentrism would not oppose the lack of the animal to the
plenitude of the human, but claims that man’s superiority over
the animal derives precisely from his deficient nature or his
originary default:
[We will] see appear in every discourse concerning
the animal, and notably in Western philosophical discourse, the same dominant, the same recurrence of a
schema that is in truth invariable…: what is proper to
man, his subjugating superiority over the animal…
would derive from his originary fault, indeed from this
default in propriety (Derrida 2008, 45).
The qualities that make man superior to the animal, such as
logos, mind, language, etc., are not simply gratuitous gifts from
God or from Nature, but emerge from his peculiar position as a
deprived being. This would be the fundamental logic underpinning all metaphysical discourses concerning the human/animal
divide. Unlike the animal, man does not have a fixed nature and
that would paradoxically explain why is he is able to gain access to these various defining traits. Leonard Lawlor has argued
that this schema can be found in nearly all traditions of Western
thought, but that it is most clearly present in those traditions
that assume the fallen nature of man such as Platonism and
Christianity:
Because of a fault, man conceives animals as being absolutely innocent, prior to good and evil, “without fault
or defect.” The animals therefore do not seem to suffer
a fall… in contrast, man is not perfect; he has fallen
and has a fault, which allows him to question. The abil-
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ity to question brings us to the axiom: it is precisely
“a fault or defect” in man, in us, that allows us to be
masters over the animals (2007, 67).
Man would have suffered a fatal fall as a result of which he
paradoxically attains a privileged position among the living beings, “[t]his would be the law of an imperturbable logic, both
Promethean and Adamic, both Greek and Abrahamic (Judaic,
Christian, Islamic)” (Derrida 2008, 20). Whence this sudden
change of discourse? It almost seems as if Derrida’s argument
that man also suffers from a deficient constitution, that man is
also “poor in world,” had somehow started to boomerang back
on him so that he thought it was now necessary to ward off
the suspicion that his own writings would be open to such an
interpretation.
In fact, there were certainly good reasons for Derrida to
hold such a suspicion. In 1994, the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler published a book called The Fault of Epimetheus
(1998) in which he argues that the origin of the human is neither to be found in some transcendental quality, nor in a particular genetic makeup, but in the structural coupling of a living being with its technical instruments. Significantly, Stiegler
finds support for his argument in the myth of Prometheus and
Epimetheus (1998, 185-203). Since this story contains in broad
outlines the central features of Stiegler’s philosophy, it seems
worthwhile to summarize it here. In Protagoras’ version of this
story as narrated by Plato, Epimetheus convinces his brother
Prometheus to entrust him with the task of distributing qualities or powers among the living creatures that was commended
by Zeus. The Titan performs his task by allotting each creature
one specific quality making sure that there is an equilibrium
between the species. But when it was time for the humans to
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receive their due, Epimetheus suddenly realizes that he had
already handed out all available qualities. When Prometheus
arrives at the scene to inspect his brother’s work, he notices
that the humans are still naked and without means of defense.
Because he is worried that their premature constitution could
lead to the total destruction of mankind, Prometheus decides to
make up for Epimetheus’ fault and goes out to steal the technical skills and fire from the gods to compensate humans for their
lack of qualities. What Stiegler wants to stress in his reading
of this myth is the fundamental undefinability of the human or
what he calls man’s “default of origin.” Hence, technics is not
proper to the human either, but merely an external prosthesis
that is only adopted afterwards, by default, to compensate for
an originary lack of property.
There is little doubt that Derrida was mainly targeting
Stiegler when he criticized those who hold that what is proper
to man derives from his originary fault. Since Stiegler wrote his
first volume of Technics and Time when he was a doctoral student of Derrida, the two must in any case have certainly been
very familiar with each other’s work. Moreover, in “Quand
faire c’est dire” (“When to do is to say”) (1994), an article that
appeared shortly before The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler already explained that his theory should be understood as an attempt to resolve the question of the difference between man
and animal which he thought Derrida has left in the air. In this
article, Stiegler revisits Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in Of
Spirit that we discussed earlier. If man is also “poor in world”
and his relation to the world is equally “guided by a narrow
sphere of drives, of desires” (Derrida 2008, 159) and the like,
Stiegler argues, then there still remains to be determined what
is the human mode of being poor in world. In other words, if
man is also a programmed being, if he does not have unmedi-
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ated access to the world either, then the specificity of the human
program still remains to be thought. Indeed, Derrida’s argument
only seems to beg the question. For if man and animal share a
radical powerlessness, does he not end up endorsing some kind
of continuism after all? Derrida seems to have anticipated such
objections and counters them as follows:
I am not advocating the blurring of differences. On the
contrary, I am trying to explain how drawing an oppositional limit itself blurs the differences, the différance
and the differences, not only between man and animal,
but among animal societies—there are an infinite number of animal societies, and, within the animal societies
and within human society itself, so many differences
(1987, 183).
But even if it is indeed the case that the philosophical tradition has always treated “the animal” as one homogenous category and consequently neglected the singularity of animal life,
then we still bear the burden to determine what constitutes the
singularity of the human animal. In order to steer clear from
traditional metaphysical prejudices, Stiegler will answer this
question by showing that the transition from the animal to the
human is not the transition from a fully programmed living being to a being guided by no program whatsoever, but the transition from a genetic program to a techno-logical or what he calls
epiphylogenetic program.
In the beginning of the third chapter of The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler writes that what is at stake in this book is
“to think the birth of the human… and to attempt this independently of all anthropologism” (1998, 135). Stiegler finds a
suitable point of departure for this project in the work of the

© Between the Species, 2011

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 14, Issue 1

71
Nathan Van Camp

French paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan. What is particularly interesting for Stiegler is that Leroi-Gourhan describes
anthropogenesis as a process of “exteriorization” in the course
of which the brain and the tool develop at equal pace. As this
non-anthropocentric concept defies the classical image of the
human as an animal to which miraculously the capacity for reflection is added, it seriously calls into question the radical opposition between the human and the animal. A crucial event for
the development of Leroi-Gourhan’s theory was the discovery
of the remains of the Australopithecus together with its flint
tools in 1959. According to Leroi-Gourhan, this was the first
bipedal humanoid to have benefited from exteriorization. What
is so important about this paleontological finding is that the
small size of the Australopithecus’ brain pan urges the conclusion that what was decisive in anthropogenesis was not cerebral development, but the erect posture and the new functional
organization of the body that ensued from this novelty in the
history of life:
The “freeing” of the hand during locomotion is also
that of the face from its grasping functions. The hand
will necessarily call for tools, movable organs; the
tools of the hand will necessarily call for the language
of the face. The brain obviously plays a role, but it is
no longer directive: it is but a partial element of a total
apparatus, even if the evolution of the apparatus tends
towards the deployment of the cerebral cortex (Stiegler
1998, 145).
The erect posture brought about a gradual suspension of genetic constraints and, consequently, an increasing indetermination
of the body functions. The immediate result was the appearance
of tools and language to fill in for this lack of genetic program-
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mability. Moreover, Stiegler writes, between the Australopithecus and the Neanderthalian tools evolved so slowly “that one
hardly can imagine the human as its operator, rather, one much
more readily imagines the human as what is invented” (1998,
134). This will be Stiegler’s thesis: the birth of the human is the
appearance of technics in the sense that the human and technics
“invent each other respectively, as if there were a technological
maieutic of what is called ‘humanity’” (1998, 142), the cortex
being informed by the tool as much as the tool by the cortex.
Leroi-Gourhan, however, will maintain that from the Australopithecus up to the Neanderthalian, “tools were still, to a
large extent, a direct emanation of species behavior” (1993,
97), which means that he thinks that in this archaic period of
thousands of years technical evolution was still mainly determined by the rhythm of cortical development, itself propelled
by genetic selection, and thus essentially of zoological origin.
According to the paleontologist it is only with the emergence
of the Neanderthalian that technical evolution frees itself completely from genetic constraints. So although Leroi-Gourhan
argues that the fact that the Australopithecus could already handle tools implies that this humanoid must have had a “technical
consciousness,” he thinks he was still not yet endowed with
a full-fledged “symbolic consciousness,” something that will
only emerge with the Neanderthalian when an extraordinary
increase in anticipatory capacities was accompanied with the
stabilization of the evolution of man’s neuro-equipment. What
is at issue here is the latitude that became available with exteriorization and the origins thereof. Stiegler argues that LeroiGourhan was wrong to say that the Australopithecus did not yet
posses a symbolic consciousness. This thesis contradicts the
simple fact that the Australopithecus must already have had the
capacity for anticipation because the possibility to perform a
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technical gesture requires, as Leroi-Gourhan himself explains,
“a good deal of foresight on the part of the individual performing the sequence of technical operations” (1993, 97). So although Leroi-Gourhan came close to recognizing that the birth
of the human coincides with the birth of technics, in the end he
gives a determining role to cortical development, implying that
the Australopithecus was still an animal and that the genuine
origin of the human is the acquisition of a faculty for symbolization. This is a conclusion that Stiegler cannot accept:
There is no such [second] origin because technical differentiation presupposes full-fledged anticipation, at
once operative and dynamic, from the Australanthropian onwards, and such anticipation can only be a relation to death, which means that symbolic intellectuality
must equally be already there. Reflective intellectuality
is not added to technical intelligence. It was already its
ground (1998, 163).
The difficulty Leroi-Gourhan found himself confronted with,
Stiegler argues, is the ambiguity of the term “exteriorization.”
It gives the impression that what is exteriorized should be preceded by some kind of (mental) interiority, something that
would function as the origin of this movement. But given the
fact that Leroi-Gourhan himself had asserted that the brain was
only a beneficiary of the rupture of exteriorization, there cannot be anything of that kind, whether it be in the guise of a
neurological impetus or a premature consciousness. What has
therefore remained unthought is the possibility that the “interior and exterior are… constituted in a movement that invents
both one and the other” (Stiegler 1998, 142), so that “neither
one precedes the other, neither is the origin of the other, the
origin being the coming into adequacy [con-venance] or the
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simultaneous arrival of the two” (1998, 152). The challenge is
to think what Stiegler calls a “mirror proto-stage” or an “instrumental maieutics,” the structural coupling of the human and
technics that makes the constitution of the one impossible and
unthinkable without the other.
It is at this stage of his argumentation that Stiegler calls upon
Derridean différance which Stiegler in this context understands
as the history of life in which are articulated different stages
of the grammē. Significantly, Derrida also based his concept
of the grammē on what Leroi-Gourhan calls the liberation or
exteriorization of programs. More specifically, Derrida finds in
Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of “program” a “non-anthropocentric
concept that does not take for granted the usual divides between animality and humanity” (Stiegler 1998, 137):
Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man
and the human adventure thus by the simple possibility of the graphie in general; rather as a stage or an
articulation in the history of life—of what I called différance—as the history of the grammē… this movement goes far beyond the possibilities of the ‘intentional consciousness.’ It is an emergence that makes
the grammē appear as such... if the expression ventured
by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, one could speak of a
‘liberation of memory,’ of an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-called ‘instinctive’ behavior up to the constitution of electronic
card-indexes and reading machines enlarges différance
and the possibility of putting in reserve (Derrida 1974,
84).
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Since the grammē does not only concern genetic inscription,
but also “electronic card indexes” and “reading machines,” in
other words, means of technical inscription, it seems that the
program is operative on both sides of the human/animal divide.
But, Stiegler argues, it is nonetheless true that this transition
from a genetic to a non-genetic program coincides with the appearance of the human and an account of the specificity of this
passage is exactly what is still missing in Derrida’s writings.
The emergence of the human, Stiegler will conclude, coincides with the appearance of a third type of memory or program
in the evolution of the living. First, there is genetic memory,
which is common to all living beings and which remains strictly internal to the organism. Second, there is epigenetic memory,
individually acquired experiences that are stored in the central
nervous system of the living organism. The central axiom of
molecular biology states that these two memories do not communicate with each other in the sense that the flow of information in organisms runs from the DNA to the proteins, from
the genotype to the phenotype, but not the other way around.
This means that individual acquired experiences are lost with
the death of the organism. With the birth of the human, however, there emerged a third kind of memory that Stiegler calls
epiphylogenetic memory―memory embodied in technical objects. Since the human is capable of exteriorizing its epigenetic
memory in material supports―from stone tools to digital storing devices―it can preserve and transmit this memory across
generations. It is this suspension of the law of life that according to Stiegler constitutes the specificity or singularity of the
human animal.
Critics such as Ben Roberts (2005) and Geoffrey Bennington
(1996) have argued, however, that it is not so much Derrida’s
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interpretation of Leroi-Gourhan that is lacking in clarity, but
Stiegler’s appropriation of it. While Derrida’s quasi-concepts
such as the grammē and the trace precisely challenge the opposition between the human and the animal, Stiegler’s distinction
between epigenesis and epiphylogenesis would simply ������
reproduce this opposition in terms of technicity. By insisting on the
fact that the human is the only living being that is able to conserve its memory in technical objects, Stiegler would merely
have invented a more subtle form of anthropocentrism. As we
have seen, this also seems to be Derrida’s own critique of Stiegler’s theory of anthropogenesis.
I think, however, that we would do injustice to Stiegler’s
philosophy if we read it as simply implying that technics is the
defining property of man since his argument is precisely that
there is nothing proper to the human. If the danger of anthropocentrism is most critical when it straightforwardly opposes the
animal to the human, then no worse could be done than to install
an insurmountable gap between them on the basis of some transcendental property. In this respect Stiegler’s refutation of what
he calls the “miracle thesis” (1998, 161), that is, the positing of
some form of “spirituality” without a rational understanding of
its provenance, is rather an attempt to diminish anthropocentric
violence than its continuation by other means. Moreover, the
suppression of both overt and latent anthropocentrism could
just as well lead to its opposite, namely the effacing of all differences between the animal and the human. As Stiegler puts it,
“the contestation of oppositions must not eliminate the genesis
of differences” (1998, 163).
When asked in an interview what he thinks about the fact
that certain primates also use tools and transmit this knowledge
to the next generation, Stiegler responds as follows:
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If you would object to me that certain large apes also
have cultures, then I would say that I am willing to accept them as members of the world which starts with
the human—in other words, as embryonic fabricators
of this third type of memory. I would most certainly
allow them to enter human history. As a matter of fact,
that is the reason why they are so close to us (2004, 49,
my trans.).
Arthur Bradley has argued that this way of responding to this
objection can only confirm the impression that Stiegler violently “absorbs every apparent exception into the narrative of
hominisation” (2006, 98). I think, however, that such an interpretation arises because it is almost impossible to use the name
of “man” without inheriting the metaphysical assumptions pertaining to this term. That is the reason why Heidegger uses the
term Dasein to designate human being and why Stiegler prefers
to call this entity simply the “who.” In other words, Stiegler
is not primarily interested in the entity we unreflectively call
“man,” but in the structure of experience that opens up when
a living being enters into a mutual constitutive relation with
technical objects:
I’m not interested in what we call “man” but in temporality, temporality that, as a form of life, has to decide
what it is to become (and it so happens that this form
of life is still called man today). Even when man is
finished, when he belongs to the past, this form of life
may well continue on, becoming ever more complex –
and perhaps man is already finished (2003, 158).
Thinking anthropogenesis as mutually constitutive with technogenesis implies that the human is not a spiritual miracle that
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is added to an animal body, but that hominization is “the pursuit of the evolution of the living by other means than life”
(1998, 135). Hominization is not a break with life, but a break
in life. Whether this negotiation with the anthropological limit
will stop generating new controversies about the
���������������
most important and decisive question of philosophy remains, however, to
be seen.
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